

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 15, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. White, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending November 15, 2002

DNFSB Activity Summary: The DNFSB site office was closed on Monday for Veteran's Day. W. White was on site for the remainder of the week.

W62 Seamless Safety (SS-21) Project: On Thursday, W62 project team personnel briefed the Standing Management Team on the status of the W62 SS-21 project. BWXT previously submitted the W62 hazard analysis report (HAR) to NNSA, who approved it, with the following six conditions of approval:

- BWXT is to identify the specific facilities for W62 operations in the HAR and ensure that facility unique hazards are addressed.
- BWXT is to insert the part numbers for certain equipment in the hazard tables where the equipment is discussed and include assumptions related to that equipment in the HAR.
- BWXT must update the accident analysis to address the staging of W62 components.
- BWXT is to ensure the key attributes of the radiation safety program (such as air monitoring, control of monitoring instruments, and radiological worker training) are identified and developed as an administrative control.
- BWXT must add the bulkhead removal fixture as a required design feature.
- BWXT must address an electrostatic discharge concern raised by the design agency by conducting additional analysis to demonstrate the concern does not exist or by implementing an engineered control to address the issue.

Of the six conditions of approval, the most difficult to resolve is likely to be the condition regarding the treatment of electrostatic discharge. Resolution of this issue may require additional analysis by the design agency and may require the implementation of an additional control.

The current schedule for startup of W62 operations under the new SS-21 process calls for authorization of operations by the end of March 2003. To meet this schedule, BWXT must complete the following readiness activities. The readiness verification by BWXT line management, currently underway, is expected to conclude by December 18, 2002. The contractor readiness assessment, which will not begin until the conditions of approval for the W62 HAR are addressed, is to conclude by January 23, 2003, allowing the NNSA to begin its readiness assessment and nuclear explosive safety study by January 24, 2003. [II.A]

Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPSs). Last week sub-contractor personnel to BWXT performed a system flush on the fire riser strainer system in the equipment room of Building 12-44. In the process of performing the flush, a leak from the hose caused water to spray on the ceiling of the equipment room and fall through the top of two safety-class UPSs in the room, damaging and disabling them. The fire detection and suppression system in Building 12-44 cells is currently being upgraded, and no nuclear explosive operations were ongoing in these facilities.

The concern over water intrusion into uninterruptible power supplies from the fire suppression system was raised in a Board staff report transmitted by the Board to NNSA on August 6, 2002. The UPSs damaged in this incident had covers that afford some protection against overhead leaks, but it was not sufficient in this case. [II.A]